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1.  The Portuguese 
arrived in Southeast Asia 
in 1509 as the result of a 
direct order by the Portu- 
guese King D. Manuel 
to look for Melaka and 
to obtain a deal with 
local authorities. The commander of the expedition, 
Diogo Lopes de Sequeira, was also in charge of a wider 
reconnaissance mission, in order to gather the largest 
possible volume of information about the commercial 
life of the city. Among the orders issued by the king, 
there was one in particular that projected the horizon of 
the Portuguese beyond local dimensions. He was urged 
to get detailed information about the Chinese, their 
physical aspect and religion, their ships and wealth, 
how often they went to Melaka and whether they 
were established there 
or not. Another object 
of research was their 
homeland, its dimension 
and how powerful their 
king was.1
The first contact 
the Portuguese had with Melaka and Southeast Asia 
was also, therefore, the first contact with the Chinese 
trade network that operated there. Two years later, 
the city was seized under the command of Afonso de 
Albuquerque. It opened the access to the Far East, 
the continental kingdoms of Southeast Asia and the 
Malay-Indonesian archipelago, and also China, to 
the Portuguese. The Chinese merchants in Melaka 
influenced the Portuguese governor in his decision to 
use the force of arms instead of diplomacy to resolve the 
conflict that opposed him to the Malay sultan.2 They 
also played a leading role in the success of Albuquerque’s 
strategy that followed the conquest of the city, not only 
supporting the assault, but also acting on behalf of 
the Portuguese in the diplomatic field and providing 
substantial information about commercial life in the 
Far East.
The messengers sent by Albuquerque to the 
Thai kingdom travelled in Chinese junks and were 
introduced to the king by Chinese traders from Melaka, 
on the way to their homeland;3 they also carried the 
first information about the newcomers to China. The 
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Chinese were precious to the Portuguese, not only to 
their success in the Straits of Melaka, but also—so 
they believed—as valuable intermediate agents for the 
contacts with China that would follow. 
2.  Some sixty years later, and after a succession of 
unfortunate attempts, the Spaniards finally established 
their Asian empire, not through the Cape of good 
Hope but by means of a link to Mexico. Since 1521 
and the success of Magalhães’ expedition they had 
looked for a way to reach Asia and the Spice Islands. 
The problem of the anti-meridian of Tordesillas, the 
tension with Portugal, the Treaty of Zaragoza and the 
technical problems that prevented the return voyage 
to Mexico, delayed the project of an Asian empire for 
several decades. An expedition led by Miguel López de 
Legazpi finally settled in the Philippine archipelago in 
1565 and was able to elude Portuguese surveillance in 
the Moluccas and their efforts to dislodge them from 
the region.4
Initially, the Spaniards pursued the access to the 
Spice Islands, but this target was soon replaced by a 
more realistic objective, which was to find a way to 
establish a direct contact with China. To the Spaniards, 
the Middle Kingdom was some sort of a new El Dorado. 
There was a considerable amount of confusion and 
outdated information about China that circulated in 
the Spanish chronicles and reports, mixed with old 
and fabulous ideas about the existence of islands of 
gold and silver somewhere in the surroundings.5 This 
clearly matched Spanish expectations of expansion 
and conquest. The initial settlement in the island of 
Cebu had been frustrating: the coveted spices did not 
exist and the local population was poor and unable 
to correspond to the model of wealthy kingdoms 
like those found and conquered by Cortés and 
Pizarro in America. The decision to move to 
Manila arose from the expectations to find a 
more auspicious environment.
Its excellent port and geographical 
position was a perfect spot for future access to 
China. However, the decisive impulse to make 
Manila the headquarters of the Spanish empire in 
Asia came from the rumours about the existence 
of a Chinese mercantile community in the city. 
Those who were disappointed with the Visayas 
and hoped to find a quick alternative target to the 
conquista were eager to confirm these reports and to 
widen the horizons of the Spanish presence into the 
Middle Kingdom.6
 The expedition under the command of Martín 
de goyti, who arrived at Manila in 1570, confirmed 
the previous information; there was, in fact, a small 
but prosperous Hokkien community in the city. They 
were called Sangleys, a designation that has raised a long 
debate about its origin and meaning.7 As had occurred 
in 1511 with Afonso de Albuquerque in Melaka, the 
Spaniards were supported by the Chinese against the 
Muslim local king.8 Therefore, it was in their best 
interest to establish good relations with them. After the 
conquest, a struggle with the Chinese pirate Lin Feng 
林凤 gave the Spaniards an opportunity to establish 
direct contacts with an imperial fleet and Chinese 
military authorities.9
China was a very important goal to the 
Portuguese and the Spaniards, who were convinced 
that establishing contacts and good relations with the 
overseas Chinese communities, in Melaka or Manila 
respectively, would allow a quick and easy access to 
Mainland China. This assumption, however, proved to 
be misleading. Firstly, it concerned two different worlds: 
the business environment of Southeast Asian Chinese 
was informal and pragmatic, made of compromise and 
practical interests, far away from the formal procedures 
and the ceremonial and rigid bureaucracy that ruled 
the imperial court of Ming China. Furthermore, the 
relationship between the territorial space of China and 
the exterior was at the time under specific and restrictive 
guidelines of which the Europeans were not aware. 
 
3.  What then was the framework that regu-
lated the relations of Ming China with the 
outside world? There had been an initial 
period of interest and openness to the 
southern region by the turning of the 
15th century. The famous maritime 
expeditions led by Zheng He 鄭和 
and the military campaigns in Viet-
nam were the most visible signs of this 
short-lived trend. However, the imperial 
court came to gradually regard with dis-
trust and disinterest the external affairs 
in Southeast Asia and the permanent 
turbulence that occurred in the region. 
Plan of the Malacca fortress. In Manuel godinho de Erédia’s Declaraçam 
de Malaca, 1613.
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The problems in Central Asia and the pressure on the 
northern border of the empire were considered the 
most serious threats to China’s territorial integrity. The 
political power was based in Beijing and became less 
interested in what was happening among the various 
quarrelling tributary states to the south.10
This shift caused a semi-closure of China to 
Southeast Asia. Diplomatic relations acquired a mere 
ceremonial and ritual tone based on formal recognition 
and acceptance of Chinese overlordship with the 
consequent tributary statements by the southern 
kingdoms. Therefore, China developed an isolationist 
policy that was to persist throughout the whole Ming 
period. In practical terms, securitarian concerns with 
the maritime borders were raised and the coast was 
closed. All trade was allowed only in the framework 
of the tributary system and, with regard to Southeast 
Asia, was centralised in guangzhou. This practice was 
known as haijin 海禁, or ‘maritime interdiction’ and it 
was formally valid, despite some variations and partial 
intermissions, for more than two centuries, to be finally 
abolished by Emperor Kangxi in the last quarter of the 
17th century.
However, this official policy was not consistent 
with the secular maritime tradition of some provinces, 
notably Fujian in the south.11 The real impact of haijin 
policies on Chinese trade networks in Southeast Asia 
still remains an open question and a subject to an 
ongoing debate. It is known that some trade centres 
of Fujian that had prospered in previous times, such 
as Quanzhou, were replaced by new ports, namely 
Yuegang.12 It is also known that Hokkien merchant 
communities were able to fully reorganise their struc-
tures and to adapt to the new rules, not only maximis-
ing the channels allowed by the tributary 
system, particularly with 
the Ryukyu Islands, but 
also intensifying their 
connections and creating new partnerships with other 
trading groups and extending their activities through-
out Southeast Asia.
From the official point of view, their activities 
were considered semi-clandestine, since all Emperors’ 
subjects were forbidden to leave Chinese soil. But the 
imperial court was in Beijing, far in the north, and the 
state bureaucracy was, to some extent, permeable in 
compromising with the maritime and coastal realities. 
This allowed some flexibility and tolerance, which could 
vary according to different political circumstances, 
economic pressures and the balance of power between 
several factions within the mandarinate.
 
4.  China, although being officially self-sufficient, 
was an economic giant avid for exchanges. In some 
coastal regions, including Fujian, the production 
of manufactured goods—porcelains and textiles of 
excellent quality—had increased and specialised. The 
maritime trade networks intensified its efforts to supply 
the domestic market and were obviously ready to take 
advantage of any relaxation of the rules imposed by the 
haijin ban to promptly reinforce the links between the 
ports of South China with those of Siam, the Malay 
Peninsula, Sunda, Borneo or Luzón.13 on the other 
hand, the Chinese markets demanded a wide range of 
foreign goods: silver, spices—especially pepper—and 
exotic woods like sandalwood and other luxury goods 
requested by the various elites across China.
There was thus a contradiction and a permanent 
tension between economic life and market demands, 
on one side, and the decisions at the political level, on 
the other. There were inevitable antagonisms between 
the official dimension that gave priority to defensive 
issues, territorial integrity and surveillance of the coast, 
and informal interests related to trade and business that 
were eventually present inside the official bureaucracy 
and the Imperial court itself.
 
5.  The arrival of the Portuguese, the folangji 弗啷哂 
as they were called, came to exacerbate these tensions 
and to change the global frame of the relationship 
between China and the Southern Seas. In 1511, 
the tributary system that had previously formed a 
linking bond between China and most Southeast 
Asian kingdoms was inactive; only Siam and Champa 
continued to send tribute delegations by sea.14 The 
conquest of Melaka, formally under Ming protection, 
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was a challenge to the traditional Chinese hegemony 
in this region, and the absence of a rapid and decisive 
response by the Ming was a clear sign of apathy towards 
Southeast Asian affairs.15
Melaka was an important part of the Chinese 
merchant network, performing a significant role in 
the function played by the city in the 15th century, 
redistributing goods and products throughout 
Maritime Asia and linking the Indian ocean, the 
Malay-Indonesian archipelago and the Far East. 
The arrival of the Portuguese in the region and the 
conquest of Melaka changed this state of affairs. The 
Portuguese used the Chinese community—mostly 
Hokkien, whom they called Chinchéus, a designation 
probably taken from the local pronunciation of the 
city of Quanzhou16—as a proxy to upcoming contacts 
with China.
A particular individual, whom the Portuguese 
called ‘Fulata’ or ‘Cheilata’, played a significant role 
in this process. He was in Melaka in 1509 and was 
present when Afonso de Albuquerque seized the city. 
In 1513, as described by the Portuguese captain in a 
letter to the governor, he returned to Melaka with 
four junks. They were almost empty because it was a 
reconnaissance mission to check the political situation 
and discern whether the Portuguese rule was solid 
or not. A first Sino-Portuguese partnership was then 
established for the return voyage to China, involving 
also the bendahara of Melaka, Nina Chatu.17 Four years 
later, the first official embassy arrived in guangzhou 
with direct orders from the King of Portugal to establish 
a contact with the Ming court in Beijing.
The Portuguese soon realised that the reality of 
China was quite different from what they expected. 
Since the initial years of their overseas expansion, they 
were used to imposing their will without too much 
opposition. In India, they applied the mixed use of 
diplomacy with naval power, requesting permission 
to erect a fortress and demanding exclusive rights 
on certain trade issues to local authorities. When 
diplomacy failed or was not persuasive enough, artillery 
and naval warfare took its place.
In China, this strategy was completely inad-
equate, not only because there was no political frag-
mentation as in India, but also due to the existing 
strict rules that regulated external contacts, which the 
Portuguese were unaware of. Exclusivity demands and 
coercive practices in trade were totally unacceptable. 
There was also a considerable 
level of misunderstanding in-
volving these initial contacts. 
The embassy led by Tomé Pires 
collapsed due to translation 
mistakes, lack of diplomatic 
preparation and ignorance 
of Chinese standards and eti-
quette.18 As a consequence, the 
Portuguese initial attempts to approach China were a 
complete failure. Local fears about foreign interference 
were awakened, those who defended a rigorous use of 
haijin rules gained strength and the Portuguese were 
banished from the coasts of China for several decades.19
 
6.  gradually, the Portuguese tried to re-approach 
China in an informal way. Melaka continued to be an 
antechamber of China. Further contacts were no longer 
made under official cover, as occurred during the reign 
of King D. Manuel, but through informal initiatives. 
Portuguese private traders developed partnerships with 
Chinese merchants and a better knowledge of local 
realities was achieved. Small groups of Portuguese 
traders were dispatched from Melaka to the shores of 
guangdong or Fujian and established in Lampacau, in 
the island of Sanchoão or in the island of Pinhal. It was 
from these discreet, although persistent, efforts and the 
convergence of both private and official interests that 
Macao would be born.
In the 1550s, thanks to this long process of 
gradual détente and informal contacts, the Portuguese 
were finally in a situation to establish an agreement 
with the authorities of guangdong, which was 
achieved by Leonel de Sousa. After a period of talks 
and negotiation, the Portuguese presence was accepted 
under certain conditions and the payment of taxes. 
As a sign of the end of the ban, they were no longer 
called folangji—a term associated with the former 
times—but Portuguese from Portugal and Melaka.20 
The viability of Macao emerged from the unofficial 
recognition of a foreign presence in the Chinese 
territory outside the tributary system. Its success as 
an exclusive and semi-official hub of trade with Japan 
was permitted by a decreasing severity of the haijin 
rules and it corresponded to the rise of a lobbying 
group inside the Chinese imperial bureaucracy, both 
in guangzhou and Beijing, that advocated greater 
openness to foreign trade.
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Somewhat later, in 1567, under pressure to find 
a solution, the governor of Fujian Tu Zemin ordered a 
partial lift of the ban on private trade. It was not intended 
to ease the entry of foreigners in China, but to regulate, 
in a partial and limited way, the output of Chinese 
ships from Fujian to the Nanyang, or the South Seas. 
Nevertheless, it caused an economic boost in the region, 
providing more stable conditions to coastal populations 
and an increase of tax revenues to the state.21
 
7.  This partial lift of the haijin made a considerable 
impact on the relations between the Chinese overseas 
communities and Mainland China, leading to a 
reorganisation and increase of commercial activities 
by the Chinese network in Southeast Asia. The effects 
were also felt in Melaka. In fact, the presence of the 
Chinchéus in the city had slowly decreased since the 
times of the Portuguese conquest. Chinese sources—
including the Ming Annals—echo this trend, saying 
it was due to the extortions made by the Portuguese 
authorities on Chinese traders who saw their ships 
seized when they attended the port.22 Asian private 
traders were actually under the pressure of the captains 
of Melaka, who frequently compelled them to submit 
to their demands and took advantage of their official 
position to constrain commercial activities. This was a 
serious problem for it caused a general distrust among 
Asian communities and made them avoid Melaka and 
search for other more favourable city-ports.
Up to the foundation of Macao, there was 
apparently some caution in Melaka concerning the 
Chinese, preventing extortions and trying to create 
a good impression; that is, at least, what is stated in 
the official correspondence.23 After 1567, 
another strong reason for the Chinese 
to feel less interested in Melaka arose. 
The endorsement of the authorities of 
guangdong and Fujian to private trade 
caused the Chinchéus to prefer 
to load pepper directly in 
the source, that is, Sunda or 
Sumatra. The Portuguese official 
trade in Banten—not only supplying 
Melaka and the Portuguese circuits 
but, most important, the Chinese 
market—would soon be lost, due to the 
Chinese competition.24 Furthermore, the 
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conditions from the local Sultan than the Portuguese, 
whom he frequently quarrelled with.25
8.  The ban lift on private trade coincided with the 
arrival of the Spaniards in the region, who settled in 
Manila in 1571. They too, like the Portuguese a few 
decades earlier, saw their position as an antechamber to 
access China and were unaware of the political realities 
and rules that regulated the presence of foreigners in 
the Middle Kingdom. Their relations with the Chinese 
authorities were also not free of misunderstandings and 
friction points. At an initial stage, say throughout the 
1570s and the 1580s, the Spaniards swung between 
two opposite intentions: to establish peaceful relations 
with China and to get a position on the coast—as 
the Portuguese achieved in Macao—or to develop an 
aggressive, conquista-like policy towards the Middle 
Kingdom. The latter was based on megalomaniac 
projects that would soon eclipse due to the defeat of 
the so-called Invincible Armada in 1588.26
The alternative project of getting permission to 
settle in the Chinese coast was not feasible either. Beside 
the specific conditions that ruled the presence of foreign 
people in Chinese territory—Macao being a remarkable 
exception—such a hypothesis was promptly and firmly 
rejected by the Portuguese, who claimed that it would 
be the ruin of Jesuit missionary work in China and the 
end of Macao and its profitable trade. Despite having 
a common ruler since 1581, Portuguese and Spaniards 
were fierce rivals in the Far East.
The latter made two attempts to establish 
themselves in South China. The first one occurred 
in 1575, soon after the seizure of Manila, when a 
delegation tried to convince the authorities of Fujian 
of this purpose.27 The second was far more dramatic 
and took place at the end of the century, when an 
expedition prepared in Manila was authorised by the 
local authorities to temporarily settle in the island of 
Pinhal and was expelled by the people of Macao.28
However, the effects of the haijin ban lift in 
Manila were the opposite of what happened in Melaka 
regarding the overseas Chinese communities. If in 
Melaka the Hokkien community decreased and 
became small and discreet, in Manila, on the contrary, 
its importance grew exponentially. The sangleys were 
important agents on the framework linking China, 
Map of Macao by Pedro Barreto de Resende, in Livro das Plantas de todas as Fortalezas, Cidades e Povoações do Estado da India Oriental by António Bocarro, 1635.
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Southeast Asia, the New World and, indirectly, 
Europe. It was thanks to their intermediary role that a 
key segment of one of the most important trade lines 
of the Modern Age was developed, the one that crossed 
the Pacific through the so-called Manila (or Acapulco) 
galleon. This vital channel pipelined the Bolivian silver 
across the Pacific to Manila, and from there to China 
and, in the opposite direction, silks and cotton cloths 
from Fujian to the Philippines and Mexico.29
Chinese sources give testimony of the rapid 
acceleration of the authorised trade between China 
and Southeast Asia, as well as the relative weight of 
the Manila-Fujian link in the context of navigation 
licenses issued by the provincial authorities. In the early 
years, their number was limited to two or three ships 
for each region of Southeast Asia and the total did not 
exceed fifty. In 1575, this number had doubled and 
by 1597, it reached 137. In 1589, for each one of the 
destination ports (both Malay sultanates and cities of 
Indochina), the figures ranged from one to four vessels 
per year and Melaka had two; Manila was a remarkable 
exception, with sixteen, which gives the idea of its 
relative importance in the general framework.30
9.  Melaka and Manila played different roles on 
Chinese trade networks established abroad. The old 
Malay emporium that flourished throughout the 15th 
century had been an important centre of Chinese 
presence, which benefited from the tributary condition 
of the Malay sultanate towards the Middle Kingdom. 
The community probably placed expectations on the 
Portuguese that came to be defrauded. Melaka lost 
much of its position as a dominant trade centre in the 
Straits region, a status now fragmented and shared with 
other neighbouring centres on the rise.
Melaka, unlike Manila, became a subsidiary 
position in the Hokkien network in Southeast Asia. 
The Portuguese had few and ineffective options at their 
disposal; to force the Chinese to go to the city instead 
of other ports in the region—a common practice in 
the late 16th century Melaka—was considered by some 
of the notables of the city in 1589, after the purchase 
of the whole cargo of pepper brought by the Chinese 
in that year.31 Imposing a ban of Chinese trade to 
neighbouring sultanates was also at stake, as occurred 
in the peace agreement with the sultanate of Johor in 
the 1580s.32 Yet all that the Portuguese could do was 
to try to attract the community and avoid any pretext 
of grievance. When the Dutch arrived in Southeast 
Asia and the Portuguese prepared punitive expeditions 
to expel them from those parts, the general orders 
issued by the authorities included specific commands 
forbidding any harm to be done to Chinese people and 
vessels eventually found.33
The presence of the Chinchéus in the city 
decreased substantially, but did not vanish. They kept 
a discreet but continuous presence throughout the 
whole period of Portuguese rule over the city and are 
occasionally mentioned in Portuguese sources. An 
additional reason may be suggested to explain this 
relatively unnoticed presence: part of the community 
may have settled definitely in Melaka and converted to 
Christianity, therefore becoming a mingled group in 
the undifferentiated category of casados and mestizos 
that formed the social core of the city.34 A century after 
the conquest of Afonso de Albuquerque, a Chinese 
Settlement (Kampung Cina) continued to exist on the 
right bank of the Melaka River, and an ‘interpreter 
of the chinchéus’ was still a useful and needed office. 
Furthermore, there is evidence in the Portuguese 
sources about projects and suggestions —though never 
accomplished—to promote the coming of Hokkien 
people to the city, either easing their tax burden, or 
planning a permanent Chinese settlement through 
granting parcels of land for cultivation.35 
10.  In Manila, the picture was completely 
different. The city came to be an essential hub of the 
Hokkien network activities in Southeast Asia, providing 
an essential segment of the silk versus silver chain 
that linked America to China. The presence of the 
Sangleys in Manila became 
fundamenta l  f o r  the 
viability of the Spanish 
empire in Asia, at two levels: 
on the seasonal connections 
between Manila and Fujian 
port cities—it is one of 
the possible origins of the 
word sangley, ‘those who 
come to trade’—referring 
thus to a temporary stay, but 
also on the local settlement 
of larger groups of immigrants 
who performed all sorts of 
functions and offices, from 
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retail business to supplying and provisioning the fleets 
destined for Mexico.
The Sangleys were therefore not a mere trade 
community, but a vital element of the social structure 
of Manila, as proved by the figures: from about 150 in 
1572 to 10,000 in 1588 and up to 30,000 on the eve of 
the massacre of 1603.36 The Spaniards followed a policy 
of segregation, establishing a specific district, the parián, 
where the community lived, and a heavy tax regime was 
applied to them. Those who converted to the Christian 
faith formed a different settlement located elsewhere, 
but the figures were relatively modest, from 400 to 500 
families.37 Throughout the 16th and 17th centuries, they 
exceeded several times the number of Spanish colonists 
in Manila and were considered a major threat to the 
security of the city. Several episodes of revolt occurred, 
resulting in brutal repression.38
However, the number of Sangleys in Manila never 
stopped growing. They are a part of the historical matrix 
of Manila—and of Luzón in a general way—for the 
role they played in the formation of the mixed colonial 
society throughout the following centuries, and the 
questions involving identitary notions like Sangley, 
Mestizo de Sangley or Tsinoy still persist as a prevailing 
issue in contemporary Philippines.39 
Editor’s note: Paper presented at the International Conference on 
‘Portugal and South East Asia: 500 Years of History’, organised by 
the Department of Portuguese of the University of Macau  (Macao, 
30 october–1 November 2012).
View of Manila Bay, mid-17th century. 
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